James Bosworth on What Comes After Lula's Stunning Win

Lula’s victory reflected both an effective campaign and a vulnerable opponent, James Bosworth says. Flavio Bolsonaro’s family name became a liability because his father, Jair Bolsonaro, had been convicted of involvement in a coup attempt. Before the first round, Flavio also faced allegations involving money laundering, a financial scandal, and ties to pharmaceutical lobbyists and prostitutes. His first-round lead shifted attention onto him and gave Lula room to catch up. The first round was largely a referendum on Lula amid an anti-incumbent mood; the runoff gave candidates time to broaden their coalitions.

Lula’s campaign also adjusted its social-media operation, putting younger people in charge and using WhatsApp to mobilize voters. Its WhatsApp group had more than 10 million members, over 5% of Brazilian voters, and helped direct people to polling places on election day after some mayors blocked bus service. Lula’s debate clips also did well online. Flavio, Bosworth says, was well coached and did not perform poorly in debates, though he did not answer the questions. A public spat between Flavio and Michelle Bolsonaro, followed by reconciliation, did little for a campaign already weak among women voters.

Bosworth had given Bolsonaro about a 64% chance of winning before the first round, while prediction markets put his chances at 80% and briefly 87%. He says the markets were too confident: Lula had better than a one-third chance, given his improving poll position and campaign performance. Polls and other data still pointed toward Bolsonaro, and Bosworth says his model accounted for issues including poll herding and correlation. Turnout changed by less than 2% between rounds, but shifts of 1–2% among nonvoters and people casting blank or invalid ballots meant millions of votes—enough to matter against a margin of about four million.

The defeat has not ended the Bolsonaro family’s influence, but Bosworth sees the right already considering how to avoid running a Bolsonaro in 2030. The party has accepted the result while Jair Bolsonaro rejects it, though its divisions are less severe than after the previous election. Bosworth says Tarcísio de Freitas or another right-wing candidate could have beaten Lula, a view he says Brazilian analysts share. More broadly, he interprets Latin America’s recent pro-Trump electoral pattern less as a durable shift right than as an anti-incumbent pendulum: higher fuel costs and inflation hurt governments, whether or not voters connect them to the Iran war or leaders’ ties to Trump.

Bosworth has seen no polling evidence that those ties have created a political penalty over the war. Brazil’s oil and soy exports may have benefited from higher commodity prices, leaving the net effect roughly neutral and possibly helping Lula, though he says it is too early to assess. He expects Brazil to matter in the next phase of Venezuela’s politics: Lula has called for new elections, and may seek to restore Venezuela’s independence from U.S. influence. The opposition dislikes Lula and blames him for obstructing a transition, but Bosworth sees room for the two sides to become quiet allies in pressing for elections.

A Venezuelan election this year is out of the question, Bosworth says, because preparations would take roughly six to nine months. Under a plan he attributes to Marco Rubio, Delcy Rodríguez would declare a presidential vacancy, a new electoral board would be formed, and an election would follow six months later. Bosworth sees July next year as ideal, with September or November possible; Rodríguez may prefer 2028 or 2029. He describes a contest over timing among Rubio, Venezuelan authorities, and people within the Trump administration, and says Rubio wants an election next year as part of his record. Brazil could exert substantial influence given its economic and military weight, shared border, and history of Brazilian firms building Venezuelan infrastructure, but Bosworth says its influence has fallen short under both Bolsonaro and Lula.

In a free and fair Venezuelan election held at the time of the discussion, Bosworth predicts María Corina Machado would beat Rodríguez by more than 90%, with an even stronger prospect if expatriates could vote; about a quarter of Venezuela’s population has left. Chevron is operating in the country and will remain for decades, while Exxon and Conoco are interested but have not re-entered. Major firms are waiting for confidence that Venezuela will honor long-term contracts; smaller companies such as NABAP are pursuing quicker deals but cannot rebuild the sector alone. Recovery would also require Machado to win support from the military and police, repair the economy and currency, restore democratic checks and balances, and rebuild industries beyond oil.