MacroVoices #551 Michael Every: Decoding The Global Geopolitical Puzzle (Part 2)

Michael Every argued that Washington is unlikely to accept Canada moving closer to China or Europe while sharing a long, undefended border with the United States. Reports that Prime Minister Mark Carney had ordered planning for a possible US invasion were, in Every’s view, credible; the reported exercise favored guerrilla resistance and retreat to the hills. He said Canada’s high-value industrial exports depend heavily on the US market, while Europe has limited need for Canadian cars, trains or jets. A turn toward Europe could therefore leave Canada more dependent on raw materials, facing years of economic pain and higher costs to counter Russian or Chinese activity in the Arctic without US support.

Every described US-China competition as a contest among groups of countries deciding how to align, not a simple two-sided Cold War. Washington wants Canada to reindustrialize, remilitarize, spend more on defense and coordinate trade and security policy with the US, including matching its external tariff on China. That alignment could reduce Canadian sovereignty, but an independent Canadian deal with Beijing could undermine US objectives. Every contrasted Canadian concern about sovereignty with what he saw as Denmark’s willingness to give up military control over Greenland to help secure North America.

In energy markets, Townsend said Axios had reported that Iran gave the US a week to lift its military blockade or face renewed asymmetric escalation; WTI crude rose about $3–$3.50 after the report. Every said Saudi Arabia, following the UAE, was moving more oil through the Strait of Hormuz despite live fire and occasional ships being hit, with higher security and insurance costs. Iran could continue attacks in Hormuz, use the Houthis to threaten Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea, or disrupt ship-to-ship oil transfers off Oman, but Every said the reach and scale of these options were uncertain. Townsend also cited a Politico report that President Trump was committed to a 90-day diesel-export ban; Every stressed the proposal was unconfirmed and called it a political rumor. Energy Secretary Chris Wright had publicly opposed it. Every warned that restricting exports could raise prices and cause shortages abroad and potentially in the US, while turning fuel allocation into a tool for favoring trusted countries and pressuring others.

Every pointed to closer coordination among China, Russia, Iran and North Korea as a source of risk. He said China had indicated Russia could not lose the war in Ukraine, and cited Iranian-designed drones modified by Russia and used heavily against Ukraine. Russian-engineered drones could eventually be returned to Iran, he said, while North Korea was developing hypersonic missiles and supplying Russia with munitions. A report that Pyongyang might send another 50,000 troops to fight alongside Russia remained a rumor. In Asia, Every said North Korean missile activity pressures South Korea, while China uses economic ties to question Seoul’s alignment with Washington. The Philippines is working with Japan and the US as China confronts Philippine positions in the South China Sea; a clash could test whether Washington would defend its treaty ally. A Russian suicide drone crashed in Romania, but Every did not expect NATO to attack Russia over the incident.

Every said national-security discussions included the possibility that Xi Jinping might move against Taiwan next year, but stressed that this was uncertain. A US-China conflict in Asia alongside the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East could become a small-scale world war, though his illustrative risk splits ranged from 70/30 to 30/70 rather than constituting a forecast. He said the US lacks enough interceptors and Pacific-fleet bunker fuel for a sustained war, while China would have the home advantage. A Trump-Xi meeting might produce a deal or help make military action strategically unviable, but its outcome was unknown. Every considered bringing Russia closer to the US against China through peace in Ukraine very unlikely. He also said Middle East instability and higher oil prices could make sustained military action in Asia harder.

On technology, Matt Berry predicted Chinese open-source AI could approach the quality of US frontier models from three or four months earlier, prompting some businesses to run free models on their own hardware rather than expose data to cloud providers. Every said the apparent gap might reflect Chinese reliance on or cloning of American models, but emphasized that he was not an AI expert and did not know how broadly this applied. He expected national-security policy to restrict strategic technology or research access rather than leave it entirely to markets, and would not be surprised by limits on Chinese open-source AI or access to US universities. He also argued that Beijing might let US companies fund frontier research before copying or distributing models to weaken them commercially. Meanwhile, cash-strapped governments may extend capital restrictions or taxes to fund AI, defense, energy and commodity stockpiles.

Every said nuclear war was not likely, and rational actors would seek to avoid it, but described tactical nuclear use as a conditional risk rather than an impossibility. If Iran’s disruption of supply chains became intolerable and other measures failed, the US might consider such weapons; a diesel-export disruption could also fail to stabilize the economy. He warned that nuclear use could normalize the weapons and make the user a public enemy. Separately, if Ukraine continued damaging Russia’s economy, he said Moscow might use a tactical weapon in Ukraine, potentially in a field, to signal that the threshold had been crossed.